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Abstract: In order to preserve the rapid rate of innovation generated by the Internet,
Congress must act to maintain the Internet's network neutrality and its "end-to-end"
design. To accomplish this goal, Congress should adopt the "Internet Freedoms"-
access to content, use of applications, attachment of personal devices, and
obtainment of service plan information-proposed by Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") Chairman Michael Powell. In addition to adopting these
freedoms, Congress should further act to prevent access-tiering-whereby providing
content or service on a network is contingent upon the payment of a fee. Adopting
an access-tiering policy would inhibit the fair competition of newly emerging
Internet services and thereby delay further Internet developments at a time when the
Internet is critical for the U.S. economy. Instead of adopting an access-tiering
policy, Congress should preserve the current end-to-end design because it facilitates
competition and creates innovative Internet uses at the margins of the network.
Author: Professor of Law at Stanford University and founder of Stanford's Center
for Internet and Society. He received his BA and BS from the University of
Pennsylvania, an MA from Cambridge University, and his JD from Yale University.
He has clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the 7 th Circuit Court of Appeals and for
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.
Testimony of Lawrence Lessig, C. Wendell and Edith M. Carl Smith Professor of Law,
Stanford Law School, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation Hearing on
"Network Neutrality" February 7, 2006.
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, my name is
Lawrence Lessig, and I am a professor of law at Stanford Law School.
For the past decade, I have been researching the relationship between
technology and Internet policy, and in particular, the relationship
between the architecture of the Internet and innovation. I am therefore
happy to have the opportunity to address the question that this
Committee is now considering: whether Congress should enact rules to
protect network neutrality.
To answer that question, this Committee must keep in view a
fundamental fact about the Internet: as scholars and network theorists
have extensively documented, the innovation and explosive growth of
the Internet is directly linked to its particular architectural design. It
was in large part because the network respected what Saltzer, Clark,
and Reed called "the 'end-to-end' principle" that the explosive growth
of the Internet happened. If this Committee wants to preserve that
growth and innovation, it should take steps to protect this fundamental
design.
In my view, the most important action that this government has
taken to preserve the Internet's "end-to-end" design was the decision
by Chairman Michael Powell to commit the FCC to enforce what he
referred to as the Internet's four "Internet Freedoms." Building upon
an idea first presented to this Committee by Microsoft's Craig Mundie
in 2002, these "Internet Freedoms" established for the first time a
federal policy to assure that network owners do not deploy
technologies that weaken the environment for innovation that the
Internet initially created. Those principles were relied upon by the
FCC when it stopped DSL provider Madison River Communications
from blocking Voice-over-IP services. That enforcement action sent a
clear message to network providers that the Internet that they could
offer must continue to respect the innovation-promoting design of
"end-to-end."
It is my view that Congress should ratify Powell's "Internet
Freedoms," making them a part of the FCC's basic law. However, in
the time since Chairman Powell announced these principles, it has
become clear that they are missing one important requirement. The
now openly-stated intentions of AT&T and others to introduce access-
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tiering to the Internet threatens to undermine application competition
on the Internet.1 Congress should act to avoid that result.
Access-tiering2 will create an obvious incentive among the
effective duopoly that now provides broadband service to most
Americans. By effectively auctioning off lanes of broadband service,
this form of tiering will restrict the opportunity of many to compete in
providing new Internet service. For example, there are many new user
generated video services on the Internet, such as Google Video,
YouAre.TV, and YouTube.com. The incentives in a world of access-
tiering would be to auction to the highest bidders the quality of service
necessary to support video service, and leave to the rest insufficient
bandwidth to compete. That may benefit established companies, but it
will only burden new innovators.
To oppose access-tiering, however, is not to oppose all tiering. I
believe, for example, that consumer-tiering should be encouraged.
Network providers need incentives to build better broadband services.
Consumer-tiering would provide those incentives.
Consumer-tiering, however, should not discriminate among
content or application providers. There is nothing wrong with network
owners saying "we'll guarantee fast video service on your broadband
account." There is something wrong with network owners saying
"we'll guarantee fast video service from NBC on your broadband
account." And there is something especially wrong with network
owners telling content or service providers that they can not access a
meaningful broadband network unless they pay an access-tax.
I do not mean "wrong" in the sense of immoral, or even unfair.
My argument is not about the social justice of Internet access. I mean
"wrong" in the sense that such a policy will inevitably weaken
application competition on the Internet, and that in turn will weaken
Internet growth.
The Internet's growth is a crucial part of the Nation's economic
growth. In my view, Congress should take steps to assure that the
current concentration in broadband access does not translate into
reduced application competition on the Internet. A "network
' See Telcos Propose Web Tiers: Once seen as a money grab by ISPs, the idea of a two-tier
Internet gains momentum, RED HERRING, Jan, 31, 2006,
http://www.redherring.com/PrintArticle.aspx?a=l 5544&sector=Industries.
2 By "access-tiering," I mean any policy by network owners to condition content or service
providers' right to provide content or service to the network upon the payment of some fee.
These fees are independent of basic Internet access fees. No one questions the right of
network owners to charge Google for the bandwidth it uses. Instead, "access-tiering" adds an
additional tax on network innovators based upon the particular service being offered.
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neutrality" policy that combined Chairman Powell's "Internet
Freedoms" with a requirement that network providers secure a level of
basic Internet service with only consumer-tiering would, in my view,
promote that growth.
II. THE END-To-END INTERNET INSPIRED A WIDE RANGE OF
INNOVATION
The Internet has inspired a wide range of innovation. Because of
its particular architectural design, that innovation has come primarily
from the "edge" or "end" of the network through application
competition. As network architects Jerome Saltzer, David Clark, and
David Reed describe,3 the original Internet embraced an "end-to-end"
design, meaning the network itself was to be as simple as possible,
with intelligence for the network provided by applications that
connected at the edge of the network.
One consequence of this design is that early network providers
could not easily control the application innovation that happened upon
their networks. That in turn meant that innovation for these networks
could come from many who had no real connection to the owners of
the physical networks themselves. Indeed, if you consider some of the
most important innovations in this history of the Internet-from the
development of the World Wide Web by a Swiss researcher at CERN,
to the first peer-to-peer instant messaging chat service, ICQ, developed
by a young Israeli, to the first web based (or HTML-based) email,
HoTMaiL, developed by an Indian immigrant-these are all
innovations by kids or non-Americans, outsiders to the network
owners.
This diversity of innovators is no accident. By minimizing the
control by the network itself, the "end-to-end" design maximizes the
range of competitors who can innovate for the network. Rather than
concentrating the right to innovate in a few network owners, the right
to innovate is open to anyone, anywhere. That architecture, in turn,
has created an astonishing range of important and economically
valuable innovation. Here, as in many other contexts, competition has
3 See Jerome H. Saltzer, David P. Reed & David D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System
Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277 (1984), available at
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf; Thomas M. Chen &
Alden W. Jackson, Commentary, Commentaries on "Active Networking and End-To-End
Arguments," 12 IEEE NETWORK May/June 1998, at 66, 69, available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ie14/65/15117/
00690972.pdfisnumber"=1 5117&prod=JNL&arnumber'690972&arSt=66&ared=7 1 &arAutho
r=Chen%2C+T.M.%3B+Jackson%2C+A.W.
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produced growth. And that competition was assured by the network's
design.
III. CONCENTRATIONS IN BROADBAND ACCESS THREATEN THAT END-
TO-END NEUTRALITY
It was the assumption of many (including me)5 that competition in
broadband access would prevent any compromise in "end-to-end"
neutrality. That was the premise of the "open access" requirement
imposed upon telecom providers. The assumption was that in a
competitive market, no individual ISP would have the market power to
successfully restrict the range of Internet applications. "Open access"
thus sought to establish a competitive ISP market, which in turn was
thought would protect network neutrality.
6
This assumption about competition protecting "end-to-end"
neutrality has been drawn into doubt by recent scholarship.7 But given
the increasing concentration in broadband provision, the question of
whether ISP competition could protect "end-to-end" neutrality is now
effectively moot. Whether or not competition among ISPs is enough,
America no longer has sufficient broadband ISP competition. In most
markets, an effective duopoly controls access to high speed Internet.
8
This concentration has now led network owners to openly advocate
changes in network policy designed to vest new control in the network
4 See Barbara van Schewick, Architecture and Innovation: The Role of the End-to-End
Arguments in the Original Internet (forthcoming 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Technical University, Berlin) (on file with author); see also Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). See generally
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD (Random House 2001).
5 See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925 (2001).
6 See Jesse Drucker, For US. Consumers, Broadband Service is Slow and Expensive, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at BI (France vigorously enforcing "unbundling" requirements for
network providers). See also Ikeda Nobuo, The Unbundling of Network Elements: Japan's
Experience, (2003), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/03eO23.pdf (Japan following a
similar policy).
7 See van Schewick, supra note 4, § 9.3.
8 Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm'n, Federal Communications Commission Release Data
on High-Speed Services for Internet Access (July 7, 2005), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-State-Link/IAD/hspdO7O5.pdf
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owner over the applications and content that flow over their network.
In the United States, there have been isolated incidents, for example,
of DSL providers blocking Voice-Over-IP ("VOIP") services.9 That
policy has become the rule in a number of foreign jurisdictions. And
as recently reported, network owners in the United States and Canada
are now discussing adding access-tiering to their networks.' 0
These changes, if allowed, would fundamentally alter the
environment for innovation on the Internet. With a network that
embeds the principle of "end-to-end," there is no danger that an
innovator's application or content will be blocked by the network
owner. Consumers might not like the innovation. That risk is
unavoidable. But an "end-to-end" network removes the risk that the
network owner will interfere with an innovation, either because it
competes with the network owner's own business (e.g., VOIP),
because the owner wants to extract payment from the innovator. This
threat-free environment induces more application innovation.
If the principle of "end-to-end" is abandoned, however, then
innovators must now include in their calculation of risk the threat that
the network owner might either block or tax a particular application.
That increased risk will reduce application investment.
IV. POWELL'S "INTERNET FREEDOMS" ARE A CRITICAL, THOUGH
INCOMPLETE, DEFENSE OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY
This concern about the costs to innovation caused by network
owners is not new. Since the 1996 Telecom Act, the FCC had been
struggling to formulate policy that balanced both the need for new
broadband investment against the risk that broadband operators would
exercise too much control over network innovation. Former FCC
Chairman Michael Powell finally resolved that policy struggle in
February 2004. In a speech given in Boulder, he outlined four
principles that he promised would guide FCC policy. As Chairman
Powell described, these "Internet Freedoms" were:
(1) Freedom to Access Content. First, consumers should
have access to their choice of legal content.
1 See Telcos, supra note 1.
9 See In re Madison River Communications, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
[Vol. 3:1
LESSIG
Consumers have come to expect to be able to go where they
want on high-speed connections, and those who have
migrated from dial-up would presumably object to paying a
premium for broadband if certain content were blocked.
Thus, I challenge all facets of the industry to commit to
allowing consumers to reach the content of their choice. I
recognize that network operators have a legitimate need to
manage their networks and ensure a quality experience, thus
reasonable limits sometimes must be placed in service
contracts. Such restraints, however, should be clearly
spelled out and should be as minimal as necessary.
(2) Freedom to Use Applications. [C]onsumers should be
able to run applications of their choice.
As with access to content, consumers have come to expect
that they can generally run whatever applications they want.
Again, such applications are critical to continuing the digital
broadband migration because they can drive the demand that
fuels deployment. Applications developers must remain
confident that their products will continue to work without
interference from other companies. No one can know for
sure which "killer" applications will emerge to drive
deployment of the next generation high-speed technologies.
Thus, I challenge all facets of the industry to let the market
work and allow consumers to run applications unless they
exceed service plan limitations or harm the provider's
network.
(3) Freedom to Attach Personal Devices. [C]onsumers
should be permitted to attach any devices they choose to the
connection in their homes.
Because devices give consumers more choice, value and
personalization with respect to how they use their high-speed
connections, they are critical to the future of broadband.
Thus, I challenge all facets of the industry to permit
consumers to attach any devices they choose to their
broadband connection, so long as the devices operate within
service plan limitations and do not harm the provider's
network or enable theft of service.
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(4) Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information.
[C]onsumers should receive meaningful information
regarding their service plans.
Simply put, such information is necessary to ensure that the
market is working. Providers have every right to offer a
variety of service tiers with varying bandwidth and feature
options. Consumers need to know about these choices as
well as whether and how their service plans protect them
against spam, spyware and other potential invasions of
privacy." (emphasis removed)
Powell's speech was an indication about enforcement strategy. In
March, 2005, that strategy was demonstrated. In an extraordinarily
swift manner, the FCC succeeded in securing a settlement with a DSL
provider, Madison River Communications. That company had
allegedly blocked VOIP on their DSL lines. In the settlement,
Madison River agreed it would not use its power over the network to
block legal applications on the network.12
Powell's strategy, in my view, was a perfect mix of carrot and
stick. His aim was to signal to network providers the kind of network
service they could provide without fear of FCC intervention. But the
Madison River case demonstrated that Powell's FCC would not
hesitate to intervene when these basic principles were violated.
Network providers thus knew the kind of business model that would
steer clear of the FCC. That had an important effect upon investment
incentives - both of network providers, and of application
developers.
There is, however, one important hole in the "Internet Freedoms"
that Powell articulated. And that risk is demonstrated in the recently
revealed intentions of major network providers to begin to implement
access-tiering for content and service providers on the Internet.
The motivation behind this sort of tiering is perfectly
understandable. Network providers now have significant market
power in the broadband market. They aim to leverage that power to
11 Michael K. Powell, Chairman Fed. Comm. Comm'n, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons
Symposium: The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet
5-6 (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
243556Al.pdf.
12 Madison River Communications, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295.
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maximize revenue. No doubt, some of that revenue will support new
network provisioning. That provisioning will of course benefit
everyone to the extent it increases the spread of broadband service.
But this form of tiering will also have consequences for the market
for application and content innovation. That danger can be seen in a
simple hypothetical.
Imagine a network owner with the ability to provision a network
that is providing six Mbps to its customers. Initially, that capacity is
the effective space for broadband application competition. Imagine
then that the network begins to offer "speed lanes" to particular video
providers. These channels effectively reduce the capacity for
broadband application competition. In this context, video providers
have the incentive both to secure for themselves sufficient bandwidth
to guarantee quality service, and the incentive to guarantee that no one
else, or at least, no one not paying the access fee, be able to provide
that network service. Thus, working with the network provider, large
video companies could secure sufficient provisioning to enable their
content to be served while leaving insufficient bandwidth to other
competitors.
There are many new user-generated video sites appearing on the
Internet. Google has one such site-Google Video-but others are
being created by traditional Internet startups. Thus, YouTube.com and
YouAre.tv are two competitors to Google that are developing similar
services to the Google Video service.
In a world with access-tiering, companies like Google, in this
context, would have an incentive to secure sufficient bandwidth to
enable its services while leaving competitors without enough
bandwidth for their own. Access-tiering would thus become another
barrier to entry for competitors, reducing application or content
competition on the Internet.
This would represent a fundamental change in the environment for
innovation on the Internet. For the first time, network owners would
have a strategic capability, as well as incentive, to create barriers to
entry for new innovators. We should remember that the current
leaders in Internet innovation all began with essentially nothing.
Google, eBay, Yahoo!, and Amazon all started as simple websites
providing limited, but fantastic, services. They had to pay no special
access-tax to be on the Internet; there was no special channeling by
Internet providers that disadvantage these competitors relative to any
others. They succeeded because the product they offered was better
than others. Competition on the merits thus drove this market.
That competition would be threatened by access-tiering. Existing
content providers have an incentive to block competitors; access-
tiering would be a means to affect that competitive advantage. And
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while these actions might not rise to the level of an antitrust violation,
it is perfectly appropriate for Congress to select a network policy that
it believes would maximize innovation and growth for the Nation.
Adding toll booths to the Internet may well benefit those who own the
roads, but it will not benefit application and content competition on the
Internet, both of which drive economic growth.
To oppose access-tiering, however, is not to oppose all tiering. It
is certainly valuable for network providers to offer consumers different
tiers of service. Such differentiation will create incentives for network
providers to improve network performance. The currently abysmal
record of broadband provision in the United States demonstrates that
they certainly need more incentives. 13  Consumer-tiering could well
provide more incentives.
But consumer-tiering would not create any of the anticompetitive
effects that access-tiering would. So long as network owners offered
neutral tiering-for example, offering high speed for video content, or
simply higher speed for large file transfers-that "discrimination"
would not harm application competition. The diversity of consumer
wants would produce a general demand for faster, cheaper Internet
service. That general demand would benefit application competition
generally.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD RATIFY POWELL'S "INTERNET FREEDOMS"
ALONG WITH A RESTRICTION ON ACCESS-TIERING
In light of this emerging threat to application and content
innovation, it is my view that Congress should enact legislation that
clearly establishes the competitive baseline for broadband service in
America. That legislation should first ratify Chairman Powell's
"Internet Freedoms." These principles are an essential element to any
"network neutrality" policy.
1" See, e.g., Enid Bums, U.S. Tops Broadband Usage, For Now, CLICKZ, Nov. 14, 2005,
http://www.clickz.com/stats/sectors/geographics/article.php/3563966 (demonstrating
comparative broadband infrastructure statistics rank broadband in America somewhere
between the thirteenth and nineteenth industrialized nation in broadband penetration. The
article ranks America at fifteenth). See also Drucker, supra note 6 (reporting it is not countries
such as Japan or Korea that have outflanked the United States. European countries too now
offer their citizens vastly superior broadband options. French households, for example, can
secure twenty Mbps service at about $1.80/Mbps. The equivalent Verizon entry-level service
plan costs almost eleven times that price).
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But in addition to these "Internet Freedoms," Congress should act
to avoid the competitive costs that access-tiering could produce. There
are two ways in which Congress could respond to this threat.
At a minimum, Congress could simply restrict access-tiering by
network providers. That would leave network providers free to offer
consumer-tiered service. But such tiering should not be allowed to
turn upon the particular provider of network content. Instead, such
tiering should be limited to either bandwidth guarantees (e.g.,
guaranteeing at least 10 Mbps) or service guarantees (e.g.,
guaranteeing fast 'video service' without specifying a particular
provider).
A more ambitious regulation would require network providers to
provide a "basic internet service" to all broadband customers. The
FCC would define what "basic internet service" was. And the FCC's
definition would turn upon a judgment about the capacity necessary to
assure sufficient competition among application and service providers.
In the current context, that could mean sufficient bandwidth to provide
reasonable video services. But as the uses of the Internet develop, the
scope of this "basic internet service" could change.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet was the great economic surprise of the 20th century.
No one who funded or initially developed the network imagined it
would have the economic and social consequences that it has had. But
though the success of the network was a surprise, we have learned a
great deal about why it was a success. Built into its basic design was a
guarantee of maximum competition. A free market in applications
was coded into its architecture. The growth of that network followed
from this basic design. The world economy benefited dramatically
from this growth.
The threat facing the Internet today is that network owners will
convince regulators to go back on that original design. Through
regulatory policies that permit broadband providers to act however
their private interests dictate, these regulatory policies would threaten
the economic potential of the network generally. New innovation
always comes from outsiders. If insiders are given both technical and
legal control over innovation on the Internet, innovation will be stifled.
Unlike many other industrialized nations, we in the United States
have failed to preserve the extraordinary competition among ISPs that
characterized early Internet growth. But despite that loss in access
competition, the "end-to-end" principle, supported in part by the FCC,
still provided significant opportunity for application and content
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competition. The changes now being spoken of by the effective
duopoly of broadband providers will weaken that application and
content competition.
It is my view that any policy that weakens competition is a policy
that will weaken the prospects for Internet and economic growth. I
therefore urge this Committee to secure and supplement the work of
Chairman Powell, by enacting legislation that protects the environment
for Internet innovation and competition that the original Internet
produced.
